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I. INCOME TAXES
A. Code* § 1. Income Tax Rates.
1993 Tax Act Raises and Compresses Estate and Trust
Rates.
On August 10, 1993, President Clinton signed into law the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993 , a comprehensive budget package
that included various taxation provisions.
Under the Act, the income tax rates for estates and
trusts are as follows:
$0-1,500: 15% of taxable income
$1,500-3,500: $225 plus 28% of the excess over $1,500
$3,500-5,500: $785 plus 31% of the excess over 3,500$5,500-7,500: $1,405 plus 36% of the excess over $5,500
Over $7,500: $2,125 plus 39.6% of the excess over
$7,500 (after 10% surtax)
The Act retains the maximum statutory rate of 28% for net
capital gains. The tax bracket thresholds will be indexed for
inflation. The new rates are effective for taxable years beginning
after 1992.
Under the Act, individuals (but not estates and trusts)
may elect to pay additional 1993 taxes caused by the change in
rates, without interest, over three years.
*All references to the "Code" are to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended.
" All references to the "Act" are to the Revenue Reconciliation
Act of 1993.
Note. The compressed rates for estates and trusts add
another reason to consider making distributions to current income
beneficiaries. Generally, individuals will not reach the 39.6%
marginal bracket until their taxable income exceeds $250,000
whereas estates and trusts will be subjected to the surtax on all
taxable income over $7,500.
B. Code § 55. Increased ANT Rates and Exemption Amount
The Act increases the AMT exemption for estates and
trusts from $20,000 to $22,500. It also provides that the first
$87,500 of alternative minimum taxable income (AMTI) in excess of
the exemption will be taxed at a rate of 26%. All AMTI which
exceeds $87,500 plus the exemption will be taxed at a rate of 28%.
The new rates and exemption amount are effective for
taxable years beginning after 1992.
C. Code § 67. 2% Floor on Miscellaneous Itemized De-
ductions.
Trustee's Investment Advisory Fees Deductible Without
Regard to 2% Limitation.
O'Neill Irrevocable Trust v. Comm'r, 93-1 U.S.T.C.
50,332 (6th Cir. 6/1993), rev'g 98 T.C. No. 17 (1992). A grantor
created an irrevocable trust for the benefit of certain family
members. The trustees hired investment advisers and paid them
$15,374 for advice on the management of $4,500,000 of assets. The
trustees deducted the full amount paid, but the IRS said that the
fees were deductible only to the extent that they exceeded 2% of
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the trust's income, after deducting the distributions deduction.
Reversing the Tax Court, the Sixth Circuit held for the taxpayer.
The Court noted that applicable state law (Ohio) requires the
trustees to invest the trust assets in the manner of a "prudent
investor," and this obligated the trustees to hire professional
advisers, if they were not themselves sufficiently expert in
investment matters. Because state law obligated the trustees to
employ investment advisers, the court held that the expense was one
"which would not have been incurred if the property were not held
in such trust."
D. Code § 103. Income Taxation of Life Insurance Proceeds.
1. Insurance-Holding Partnership Sustains Partnership
Classification, Avoiding Transfer-for-Value Rule.
Ltr. Rul. 9309021. Three individuals signed a cross--
purchase buy-sell agreement with respect to the stock of their
closely-held corporation. The buy-out was funded with insurance
held by a partnership formed exclusively to manage the life
insurance policies. The IRS said that the entity was a partnership
for tax purposes, because it lacked the corporate characteristics
of centralized management and limited liability. Further, the
transfer-for-value rule would not apply with respect to exchanges
of the policies under the partnership agreement because the
insureds were partners in the partnership. The life insurance
proceeds received by a partner as a result of the death of the
other partner increased the receiving partner's distributive share
as tax-exempt income and increased his basis in his partnership
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interest. Accordingly, the life insurance proceeds received by a
partner would not be taxable to the extent that such proceeds did
not exceed his adjusted basis in his partnership interest
immediately before the distribution.
Note. The use of a partnership for this purpose has
become more common. Of course, the estate of the first
partner/stockholder to die includes the value of his or her
partnership interest, including a proportionate share of the
proceeds on his-or her own life.
E. Code § 170. Charitable Gifts.
1. Act provides Permanent AMT Relief for Charitable
Contributions of Appreciated Property.
Recently, if appreciated property was contributed to
charity, the appreciation was treated as an item of tax preference
for purposes of the alternative minimum tax (AMT). The Act
eliminates this preference treatment for contributions of tangible
personal property made after June 30, 1992 and contributions of all
other appreciated property made after 1992. However, the change
does not apply to any carryover for contributions made before these
effective dates.
2. Act Requires New Confirmation of Charitable Gifts.
The Act requires a taxpayer claiming any charitable
contribution deduction of $250 or more to obtain a contemporaneous
written acknowledgement of the donation from the charity. The
acknowledgement should include a recitation of the amount of cash
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contributed as well as description (but not a valuation) of all
noncash contributions plus a description (and good faith estimate
of value) of any goods or services provided as consideration for
the contribution.
The Act requires charities to inform donors of such so-
called quid pro quo contributions (in excess of $75) (other than
intangible religious benefits) of the amount of the contribution
that is deductible. Failure to make the disclosure is penalized
by $10 per contribution fines, up to $5,000 for a particular fund-
raising event or contribution.
These provisions apply to contributions made after 1993.
3. Post-Gift Transactions Can Be Used in Valuing
Closely-Held Stock Given to University.
Krapf v. U.S., 1992-2 U.S.T.C. 50,537 (Fed. Cir.
10/1992). The founder of a corporation gave some of his shares in
the company to a university. The taxpayer valued the stock at
$10.00 per share, based on the amounts paid to two employees when
the corporation repurchased their shares a year earlier. Three
years later, the stock was sold for $0.40 per share in two
transactions, including one sale by the university of the
contributed shares. The following year, however, the stock was
again sold for $10.00 per share. The IRS said that the stock was
worthless when contributed, and the Claims Court found that it had
a value of $4.34 per share. The Federal Circuit reversed and re-
manded the case, finding that the post-gift events were properly
considered, but incorrectly evaluated by the trial court.
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P. Code § 408. IRA Roll-Overs.
IRA Received Through Estate and Inter Vivos Power of
Appointment Trust Could Be Rolled-Over.
Ltr. Rul. 9235058. A decedent's IRA was made payable to
his estate. The beneficiary of the estate was an irrevocable trust
that, on the decedent's death, divided into marital and nonmarital
shares. The IRA was allocated to a marital trust, which was
revocable by the decedent's widow. The widow then terminated the
trust, distributed the assets to herself, and rolled them into an
IRA, within 60 days of the distribution from the IRA. The IRS held
that the widow's right to revoke the trust made her the trust's
owner, and that the payment would be treated as having been made
to the widow.
Note. Consider a marital power of appointment trust when
there is a significant IRA balance. Alternatively, the IRA can be
made payable outright to the surviving spouse, with the trust as
the alternate beneficiary, permitting a disclaimer if the trust
format is preferable at the time.
G. Code § 453B. Disposition of Installment Obligations.
Automatic Termination of SCIN is a Disposition.
Estate of Frane v. Comm'r, 93-2 U.S.T.C. 50,386 (8th
Cir. 7/1993), aff'g in part, rev'g in part 98 T.C. 341 (1992).
The decedent sold his wholly-owned corporation to his four children
in exchange for four 20 year self-canceling installment notes
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(SCINs). The decedent's life expectancy exceeded the term of the
notes, but the decedent died two years after the sale.
The Tax Court held that the death of the obligee amounted
to a disposition under Code § 453B(f), and that the untaxed capital
gain was income to the decedent's estate. The Tax Court said that
the termination of the note was a disposition, even though it did
not involve an actual transfer or specific release by the will.
Because it was income to the estate on account of the seller's
death, the Court reasoned the gain was not IRD. This decision was
reviewed by the entire court.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part,
holding that the gain had to be recognized by the decedent's
estate, rather than on the decedent's final income tax return. The
Court refused to treat the cancellation of a SCIN differently from
any other form of cancellation of an installment obligation merely
because there was no independent act of cancellation. The Court
also held that the basis of the obligors in the assets exchanged
for the obligation reflected the full value of the note instead of
the value actually paid.
H. Code § 664. Charitable Remainder Trusts.
Discretionary Trust Can Be Beneficiary of Charitable
Remainder Trust.
Ltr. Rul. 9328041. A decedent's will created three
trusts, a 5-year and a 10-year charitable annuity trust and a
20-year charitable unitrust. The noncharitable beneficiary of each
trust was one of several discretionary trusts created for the
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benefit of members of the decedent's family. The remainder of each
trust was a charitable organization. The IRS ruled that the trusts
were qualified charitable remainder trusts, noting that as long as
the term of the noncharitable interest is a number of years, rather
than someone's lifetime, the beneficiary can be another trust,
rather than one or more individuals.
I. Code §§ 671-679. Grantor Trust Rules.
1. Right to Add Descendants Creates Grantor Trust
Status for S Corporation Trust.
Ltr. Rul. 9304017. A decedent created a trust to hold
S corporation stock. The decedent gave a nonadverse (but not
necessarily independent) trustee a broad power to pay income and
principal among the decedent's children, in such shares as the
trustee deemed appropriate. The trustee also was granted the power
to add and remove as beneficiaries any of the decedent's
descendants, and the right to renounce this power at any time. At
the death of both the decedent and the decedent's spouse, the trust
would divide into separate shares for each of the decedent's
then-living children who then are beneficiaries of the trust. The
IRS ruled that the trust was a grantor trust under Code § 674,
owned entirely by the decedent. At the decedent's death, the trust
would create separate QSSTs for the decedent's children.
2. Right to Substitute Assets Creates Grantor
Charitable Lead Unitrust With Double Deductibility.
Ltr. Rul. 9247024. An individual created a charitable
lead unitrust which, to secure an accelerated income tax deduction,
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needed to be a grantor trust. Code § 170(f) (2) (B). To make the
unitrust a grantor trust, the individual granted a related party
the nonfiduciary right to substitute assets of equivalent value for
any assets held by the trust, giving the trustee the independent
right to verify the equivalency of values. The IRS said that the
trust would be a grantor trust under § 675(4), and no portion of
it would be included in the grantor's gross estate under §§ 2036,
2037, 2038, 2041, or 2042, on account of the power to substitute
assets.
Note. This creates an unusual trust that qualifies for
the gift tax charitable deduction as a gift of a guaranteed
unitrust interest, but also provides an accelerated income tax
deduction.
J. Code § 691. Income in Respect of a Decedent.
1. Proceeds of Sale of Real Estate Pursuant to Option
Agreement Were Not IRD.
Ltr. Rul. 9325029. A decedent died owning certain real
estate subject to an option agreement granted by the decedent prior
to the decedent's death and exercisable only after the decedent's
death. After the decedent's death, the real estate was sold
pursuant to the option. The IRS ruled that the gain was not IRD,
because at decedent's death, the decedent was not unconditionally
entitled to the proceeds of the sale. The IRS also noted that the
real estate could not be conveyed unless the option holders first
executed a sales contract after exercising the option.
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Notb. The IRS also noted that the basis of the real
estate in the hands of the estate was its fair market value on the
date of death, taking into account the existence of the option.
2. Disclaimed Retirement Benefits Taxable to the
Recipient, not Disclaimant.
Ltr. Rul. 9319029. A widow disclaimed a portion of her
deceased husband's profit-sharing plan by a disclaimer that was
qualified under state law and § 2518. The IRS said that the
disclaimed benefits were IRD, and taxable to the ultimate
recipient, not the disclaimant. If the estate of a decedent
transmits-the right to IRD to another person who would be required
to include that income when received in his or her gross income,
only the transferee must include that amount in gross income. The
widow's disclaimer satisfied this requirement because it was a
transfer at death to persons pursuant to their right to receive it
by reason of the death of the decedent or by bequest, devise or
inheritance of the decedent.
3. Appreciation in Value of Both Series E and Series
H Savings Bonds is IRD, Accelerated on Funding
Pecuniary Share.
Ltr. Rul. 9315016. A decedent funded a revocable trust
with both Series E U.S. Savings Bonds and Series H bonds, acquired
in an exchange for Series E bonds. When the decedent died, the
value of the bonds exceeded the decedent's purchase price, and the
bonds were distributed to satisfy a pecuniary charitable bequest
to a private foundation. The IRS ruled that the appreciation in
value of the bonds represented accrued interest and was, therefore,
IRD, and that the distribution of the bonds in satisfaction of a
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pecuniary legacy, even to a charity, caused the trust to recognize
the previously-untaxed income. Citing Rev. Rul. 67-74, 1967-1 C.B.
194; and Kenan v. Comm'r, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940).
K. Code § 1001-1035. Recognition of Gain and Amount of
Gain.
1. Exchanges of Life Insurance Contracts Were Tax Pree
Despite Differing Nationalities of Insurers.
Ltr. Rul. 9319024. A U.S. citizen exchanged a
nonvariable deferred annuity contract issued by a U.S. insurer for
a nonvariable deferred annuity contract issued by a foreign
insurer. The U.S. annuity was to begin on September 1, 2033, and
the foreign annuity was to begin on September 20, 2002. Both
policies are annuities under Code § 1035(b) (2). The IRS ruled that
the exchange is tax-free under § 1035 because the legislative
history indicates that a contract is life insurance without regard
to the nationality of the issuer.
2. Swap of Joint and Survivor Life Insurance Policy for
Single Life Policy is Tax-Deferred, When One Insured
Is Already Deceased.
Ltr. Rul. 9248013. An individual created an irrevocable
life insurance trust to buy a joint and survivor (or "last to die")
insurance policy on his life and the life of his spouse. The
spouse died first, causing the policy cash value to grow signifi-
cantly. The trustee wanted to exchange the policy for a universal
life policy on the life of the widower alone. The IRS held that
such an exchange would be tax-deferred under Code § 1035, in part
-12-
because the spouse's death meant that there would be no change in
the insureds.
Note. If both insureds were still alive when the
exchange occurred, the exchange should not qualify under § 1035,
because there would no longer be an identity of insureds.
L. Code § 1361-1367. Corporation Trust and Basic S
Corporation Requirements.
1. Even a Remote Possibility of Improper Distribution
Disqualified Separate Share Trust as QSST.
Rev. Rul. 93-31, 1993-17 I.R.B., p. 5 (4/1993). A
decedent created a trust to hold stock of an S corporation. The
trust provided for income to be paid to A and B in equal shares,
but there was a remote possibility that one of the beneficiaries
would receive more than its proportionate share of trust corpus.
The possibility was so remote as not to prevent application of the
separate share rule under Code §§ 663(c) and 1361(d) (3). However,
the IRS said that the requirements of § 1361(d)(3)(A)(ii) must be
met for a trust to be a QSST, and even a remote possibility that
the corpus allocated to the separate share of one beneficiary could
be allocated to the other was sufficient to disqualify the trust.
Thus, the IRS ruled that the trust terms must provide that any
corpus distributed during the life of the current income
beneficiary be distributed only to that beneficiary.
Note. The IRS also noted that if the application of this
ruling caused an inadvertent termination of an S-corporation
election, relief could be requested under § 1362(f).
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2. Income Beneficiary Taxed on Gain From Sale of S
Corporation Stock by QSST.
Rev. Rul. 92-84, 1992-40 I.R.B., p. 24 (10/1992). A QSST
sold all or part of its S corporation stock. Local trust law
requires that the gain or loss on the sale of capital assets be
allocated to corpus, rather than income. The IRS said that, as the
income beneficiary is treated as the owner of the portion of the
trust consisting of the S-corporation stock under Code § 678, the
income beneficiary must take into income any item of gain or loss
directly related to the stock. The IRS said that the gain or loss
on the stock sale was directly related to the stock and therefore
clearly taxable to the income beneficiary.
Note. The IRS did not discuss what happens when the sale
is on the installment basis and the trust ceases to be a QSST. It
is far less clear that the income beneficiary is taxable on the
gains recognized in the year after the trust no longer owns any S
corporation stock.
3. Individual Retirement Account Can Never Be An
Eligible Subchapter S Shareholder.
Rev. Rul. 92-73, 1992-37 I.R.B., p. 7 (9/1992). An
individual owned stock of an S corporation, and assigned it to a
trust that constituted an Individual Retirement Account, under Code
§ 408(a). The IRS ruled that a trust that is used as an IRA cannot
be an eligible S corporation shareholder. The IRS noted that the
trust cannot be a QSST because the beneficiary of a QSST must elect
to have the trust treated as a beneficiary-controlled trust under
§ 678, so that the beneficiary is taxed on all trust income cur-
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rently. § 1361(c) (2)(A)(i). Alternatively, were the trust a
grantor trust under § 671, the participant would be the grantor and
taxed on all trust income currently. IRAs, on the other hand, are
taxed differently under § 408. The beneficiary of an IRA is
taxable only when distributions are made, and then under the rules
of § 72. Thus, the rules for taxation of IRAs are inconsistent
with those for S corporation trusts.
4. Crummey Demand Power Creates an Eligible S
Corporation Trust Via Code § 678.
Ltr. Rul. 9311021. An individual created a trust with
separate shares for each of the individual's three children. The
trustee had discretion to pay income and principal to each child
under an ascertainable standard. When each child reaches 40, the
trust funds will be paid to him or her outright. If the child dies
before 40, his or her share will be held for that child's
descendants. Each child is given a Crummey demand power over all
gifts to the trust. The grantor represented that no gifts would
be made in excess of the quantitative limitations on the Crummey
power. The IRS ruled that the demand power made the child the
trust's owner under Code § 678(a), and that the child was the owner
of the trust under §§ 677 and 678(a)(2). Furthermore, each child
was given a nonfiduciary power to remove and replace assets,
causing grantor trust status under § 675(4). Because the child
owned the entire trust under these sections, the trust was an
eligible S corporation stockholder under § 1361(c)(2)(A)(i).
Note. If gifts may exceed $5,000 per year, it is also
a good idea to give each child a limited testamentary power of
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appointment over the remainder interest. This would avoid causing
a taxable gift by the child when his or her demand power lapses
unexercised. This appears not to have been done or ruled upon here.
Further Note. This is an excellent alternative to the
QSST, since the trustee need not be required to distribute income
or principal currently. Furthermore, if the beneficiary is given
a general testamentary power of appointment over the entire trust
fund, the trust will qualify for the annual exclusion under both
the gift and generation-skipping transfer tax rules.
K. Income Tax Liens.
1. Code § 6654. Simplified Safe Harbor Provision for
Estimated Tax.
The Act simplifies the safe harbor for avoiding a penalty
on underpayment of estimated tax based on the prior year's tax by
submitting a provision that if the prior year's adjusted gross
income exceeds $150,000, then a penalty may be avoided by paying
110% of the prior year's tax rather than 100%. The Act retains the
safe harbor that a penalty may be avoided by paying 90% of the
current year's tax.
The new provision is effective for estimated tax payments
applicable to taxable years beginning after 1993.
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11. ESTATE TAXES
A. Code § 2001. Estate Tax Rates.
1. Act Makes 55% Rate Permanent.
The Act makes permanent the 55% top estate, gift, and
generation-skipping transfer tax rate. The rates are effective for
decedent's dying, gifts made and generation-skipping transfers made
after 1992.
2. Fourth Circuit Agrees That IRS Can Revalue Gifts
After Death.
Levin v. Comm'r, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 60,128 (4th Cir.
3/1993), aff'g sub nom. Estate of Prince v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1991-208 (1991). A decedent gave bonds issued under the 1937
Housing Act to her children, filing gift tax returns and reporting
the transfers as exempt from gift tax. The 3-year period for
assessing gift taxes expired before the decedent died. The IRS
said that the bonds had a substantial value for gift tax purposes,
and revalued them for purposes of setting the estate tax rate under
Code § 2001. The Fourth Circuit, affirming the Tax Court, said
that the amount of the decedent's "adjusted taxable gifts" could
be revalued despite the expiration of the statute of limitations
on the gift tax. The statute of limitations on the gift tax does
not extend to the revaluation of gifts for estate tax purposes.
B. Code § 2031. Valuation.
1. CPA' s Marketability and Minority Discounts Rejected.
Estate of Berg v. Comm'r, 976 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir.
10/1992), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 26.92% interest in a
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closely-held real estate holding and management company. The value
of the company's underlying assets was approximately $4,000,000,
so the value of the decedent's stock, before discounts, was
$1,000,000. The estate claimed a 60% discount for lack of control
and lack of marketability. The estate tax return included an
explanation of the discount, but not an appraisal. Rather, the
estate merely said that it was relying on earlier Tax Court
decisions sustaining a 60% discount for the stock of a real estate
holding company. The Tax Court rejected the estate appraisals in
favor of the IRS approach, which looked at comparable publicly
traded real estate investment trusts and which concluded that a 30%
discount (20% lack of control; 10% lack of marketability) was
appropriate. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court, noting
that the estate had failed to prove that the Tax Court's determi-
nation was "clearly erroneous." The Eighth Circuit said that the
Tax Court's opinion showed a careful weighing of the substance of
the appraisers' reports and the backgrounds of those who gave the
expert testimony.
Note. The Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court in part,
finding that the estate was not liable for an addition to tax for
understating its tax liability because it had reasonably relied on
its accountant's valuation of the stock.
2. Buy-Sell Agreement Price Did Not Fix Estate Tax
Values Because It Was Adopted Primarily For
Testamentary Purposes.
Estate of Lauder v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1992-736
(12/1992). A decedent owned voting and nonvoting stock of EJL
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Corporation, the holding corporation for. Estee Lauder, Inc., an
internationally-known fragrance manufacturer. In 1974, at the sug-
gestion of one of the decedent's sons, the stockholders entered
into a cross-purchase buy-sell agreement. The purchase price was
set by formula based on the book value of the stock, excluding the
value of intangible assets. The date of death value of the
decedent's stock under the agreement was $4,111 per share, and the
value listed on the estate tax return was $4,300 per share. The
IRS asserted that the stock was worth $13,250 per share, and
assessed a deficiency of $42,702,597. The Tax Court held that the
agreement did not fix estate tax values, because it was used as a
device to shift the value of the business to the children at a
bargain price. The court noted that the decedent was in his 70's
when the agreement was signed (although he lived another 9 years);
no appraisal was used to set the formula; the parties did not
attempt to negotiate the formula at all; and the formula excluded
intangibles, even tholgh the intangible assets of the corporation
were immensely valuable.
3. Fractional Interest in Real Estate Given Only Small
Discount.
Ltr. Rul. 9336002. A decedent died owning an undivided
one-half interest in a ranch valued at $1,311,845. The decedent's
appraisers claimed a 30 percent discount against the proportionate
value of the whole property. The IRS noted that a buyer could sue
to partition the property with relative ease, and therefore said
that if the discount were allowable at all, it must be limited to
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the estimated costs of partition.. Citing Estate of Fittl v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1986-542 (1986).
Note. This position is inconsistent with numerous
opinions that have granted significant discounts for partial
interests in real estate. The discounts are always based on
comparable sales of partial interests, and the fact that most
buyers do not want to sue for partition, and many properties are
difficult, if not impossible, to partition. In such cases, the
buyer of a partial interest really only acquires the right to force
a sale to a third party and a right to a share of the proceeds.
C. Code § 2035. Transfers Within Three Years of Death.
Life Insurance Policy Purchased Through Re-executed
Contract Excluded From Gross Estate.
Ltr. Rul. 9323002. The decedent initially applied for
two life insurance policies, listing herself as "proposed insured"
and naming her estate as the beneficiary of the policies. The
space for "owner other than the insured" was left blank. The
application stated that it would "take effect only if the first
full premium is paid and [the] policy issued and delivered to the
owner." Later that same year, but before any premium had been paid,
the decedent decided that the policies should be owned by her two
sons, and she filed a supplementary application under which the
sons were named owners and beneficiaries. No premium was paid with
the supplementary application. Thereafter, a premium was paid and
the policies were issued to the two sons. The IRS ruled that the
decedent never held any economic ownership or contractual rights
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in the policies, and that the three-year rule of Code § 2035(d) was
never triggered. The IRS noted that applicable-state law (Texas)
did not give the decedent any rights over the policy until it is
issued. The IRS noted that an insurance policy application is
merely an offer to buy insurance, and that the application is not
enough to convey incidents of ownership until it is accepted. The
IRS noted also that premium rates had increased since the decedent
had filed the original application, but that the insurance company
agreed to use the more favorable rates with respect to the
supplementary application. However, the transfer of this favorable
premium rate from the decedent to the policy owners did not
constitute the transfer of an incident of ownership in the policy
itself.
D. Code §§ 2036-2038. Gifts with Retained Interests.
1. Gift-Leaseback Recharacterized as a Retained Life
Estate.
Estate of Maxwell v. Comm'r, 93-2 U.S.T.C. 60,145 (2d
Cir. 8/1993). A decedent sold her personal residence to her only
child and the child's spouse for $270,000. Decedent forgave the
$20,000 down payment and took back a $250,000 mortgage. Decedent
then leased the house back for five years for an amount that was
approximately equal to the mortgage payments. Decedent was then
82 years of age and suffering from cancer, such that she was
unlikely to live for five years. Decedent forgave each principal
installment as they became due, and in her will, the decedent
forgave the outstanding debt. The Second Circuit, affirming a
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decision of the Tax Court, found that there was an understanding
between parent and child that the parent would be allowed to live
in the house for the rest of her life, and that no payments would
have to be made on the notes. The court recharacterized the
transaction as a gift with a retained life estate, noting that no
payments were made on the debt, that the child never occupied the
house, and that the debt amortization and rental payments were
substantially the same.
2. Virginia Code § 11-9.5 Authorizing Gifts by
Attorney-in-Fact Is Retroactively Valid for Estate
Tax Purposes.
Estate of Ridenour v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1993-41
(2/1993). An individual executed a durable general power of
attorney that did not specifically grant or deny the authority to
make gifts. The attorney-in-fact made gifts on the individual's
behalf, consistent with a pattern of prior gifts. The IRS, citing
Estate of Casey v. Comm'r, 948 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1991), viewed the
gifts as unauthorized and voidable, and included them in the
decedent's gross estate under Code § 2038(a). The Tax Court,
however, said that Va. Code § 11-9.5 (Michie Supp. 1992), passed
by the General Assembly and signed by the Governor March 30, 1992,
had validated the gifts retroactively. The court noted that the
Virginia General Assembly provided that this portion of the legis-
lation was "declaratory of existing law." 1992 Va. Acts ch. 544.
The court focused on what the Virginia Supreme Court would conclude.
on the issue. See Comm'r v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967). The
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court indicated that Virginia law permits the General Assembly to
enact retroactive laws.
3. Retention of General Partnership Interest in Family
Limited Partnership is Not a Retained Interest Under
Code § 2036(a).
Ltr. Rul. 9310039. Husband and Wife created a family
limited partnership, to which the husband contributed $990,000 in
cash for a 1% general partnership interest and a 98% limited
partnership interest, and the wife contributed $10,000 in cash for
a 1% limited partnership interest. The partnership holds stocks
and securities and was not required to distribute income or
principal except in the discretion of the general partner, the
husband, or at termination. All distributions will, however, be
made to the partners in proportion to their partnership interests.
Husband gave his limited partnership interests to the wife. The
IRS ruled that the limited partnership interests are not includible
in husband's gross estate under Code § 2036(a), despite the
husband's power to control the distribution of income as general
partner. The IRS noted that under applicable state law (Mas-
sachusetts) each partner has a fiduciary duty to the other
partners. By analogy to U.S. v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), the
IRS did not treat the general partnership interest as a retained
right to control income of the transferred interest.
Note. This is an important ruling, since the IRS's
previous ruling regarding gifts of limited partnership interests
by a general partner involved a partnership that generated no
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income. See Ltr. Rul. 9131006 (involving availability of the gift
tax annual exclusion).
E. Code § 2041. Powers of Appointment.
1. Power to Invade Principal for "Continued Comfort"#
is Not a General Power of Appointment.
Estate of Visserling v. Comm'r, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 60,133
(10th Cir. 4/1993), rev'g 96 T.C. 749 (1991). A decedent's mother
created a trust for the benefit of decedent and decedent's
siblings, naming the decedent and a bank as co-trustees. The
trustees were empowered to pay the decedent principal for the
beneficiaries "continued comfort, support, maintenance, or
education." The decedent died without ever exercising the power.
The Tenth Circuit, reversing the Tax Court, held that decedent did
not have a general power of appointment. The court said that
"comfort" would not be an ascertainable standard, but that
"continued comfort" was an ascertainable standard related to
health, education, support, or maintenance.
2. Retroactive Ohio Statute Assures That Trustee's
Beneficial Interest in Trust is a Limited Power of
Appointment.
Ltr. Rul. 9323028. A husband's will created a trust and
named the wife and a bank as co-trustees. The trustees had
discretion to distribute the income and accumulated income to the
wife and to their child for whom the trust was created. Ohio Rev.
Code § 1340.22 provides that a fiduciary cannot make discretionary
distributions to himself or herself unless the power is limited by
an ascertainable standard,, and that any such power that authorizes
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discretionary distributions expressed in terms of "comfort" (among
other things) is limited by an ascertainable standard related to
the health, education, support and maintenance. This statute was
enacted effective October 8, 1992, but it states that it was the
intention of the legislature that this rule would be a codification
of existing law. The IRS said that the statute was declaratory of
existing Ohio law, and that the trust did not grant the wife a
general power of appointment over income or accumulated income.
3. Power to Remove and Replace Corporate Trustee Avoids
Imputation of Power of Appointment.
Estate of Wall v. Comm'r, 101 T.C. No. 21 (10/1993). In
1979 the decedent executed three trust instruments establishing
irrevocable inter vivos trusts for the benefit of her children.
The grantor retained the right to remove the corporate trustee and
replace it with another corporate trustee which had to be
"independent" from the decedent. In each case, the trustee had
the authority to distribute principal and income to beneficiaries
essentially unrestrained by an ascertainable standard. The
decedent retained no other power or interest in the trusts other
than the right to make additional contributions. The IRS asserted
that the trusts were includible in the decedent's gross estate
under § 2036(a)(2) or § 2038(a)(1) because in creating the trusts
she reserved the right to remove the trustee and appoint a
successor. The IRS argument was predicated on Rev. Rul. 79-353.
The Court concluded that Rev. Rul. 79-353 is "supported neither by
cogent argument nor by cited cases supporting the conclusion
reached" and held for the taxpayer.
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F. Code §§ 2053-2054. Estate Expenses and Losses.
1. No Deduction for Debts Owed to Children When
Unsupported by Consideration.
Estate of Flandreau v. Comm'r, 93-1U.S.T.C. 1 60,137 (2d
Cir. 5/1993). Decedent made a series of gifts to her sons and
daughters-in-law, and then borrowed the money back. Each of the
12 promissory notes had a term of 15-years, despite the fact that
the decedent was already 70 years of age when she began the
gift-borrow back plan. None of the notes bore interest or were
secured, and no repayments were ever actually made. The IRS said
that no deduction was allowed to decedent's estate for the notes
because they were unsupported by consideration. Affirming a
memorandum decision of the Tax Court, the Second Circuit held that
the circular nature of the transactions, including the fact that
decedent would have been 95 before she received all of the
repayments, suggested a lack of genuine intent to create a debt.
Thus, no deduction was allowed under Code § 2053(c) (1) (A), because
the debts were not "contracted bona fide and for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth."
2. Interest Expenses Paid from Estate Income Does Not
Reduce Residuary Estate.
Rev. Rul. 93-48, 1993-25 I.R.B. p. 9 (7/1993). The IRS
said that it changed its position as a result of several court
rulings, and now holds that post-death interest paid by an estate
from the residuary estate may be deducted as an income tax
deduction, without reducing the amount of the residuary estate for
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estate tax purposes. Therefore, a charitable or marital deduction
from the residuary estate will not be prejudiced by the payment of
interest from estate income, nor will such interest reduce the
available credit under Code § 2013.
G. Code § 2055. Charitable Deductions.
.. Administrative Expenses Paid from Estate Income
Reduce Charitable Deduction.
Burke v. U.S., 93-2 U.S.T.C. 60,146 (Fed. Cir.
8/1993). Decedent's executor successfully petitioned the state
probate court to permit the payment of estate administrative
expenses from income, rather than from the principal of the estate.
Decedent's will directed the payment of administrative expenses
from "the residuary estate" but with a clear goal of minimizing
estate and inheritance taxes. A charity received the residuary
estate "after paying therefrom ... all administration expenses."
Affirming the trial court's decision, the Federal Circuit held that
administrative expenses deducted out of income must reduce the
charitable deduction from the residuary bequest. The Court said
that the gross estate, as defined under Code § 2031, is the sole
source for all administrative expenses, and any such expenses must
be accounted for as part of this estate, without regard to income
produced.
2. Unlimited Right to Make Small Preresiduary
Dispositions Disqualifies Charitable Residue.
Estate of Marine v. Comm'r, 93-1 U.S.T.C. 60,131 (4th
Cir. 3/1993), aff'g 97 T.C. 368 (1991). Decedent's will left
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several small specific bequests, including one to his housekeeper,
with a charitable residue to two universities. To encourage the
housekeeper to stay in his employ, decedent changed his will to
give his personal representative discretion to make bequests of up
to 1% of decedent's gross probate estate "to persons who
contributed to [decedent's) well-being" or who "were otherwise
helpful" to the decedent. After decedent's death, the personal
representative made a few small bequests and then distributed the
residuary estate to charity. The Fourth Circuit, affirming the Tax
Court, held that the charitable residuary bequest was not
deductible. The court noted that Regs. § 20.2055-2(a) denies a
charitable bequest of a remainder interest unless it is
ascertainable. Since there was no limitation on how many 1%
bequests could be left to noncharitable beneficiaries, the
residuary disposition was not ascertainable.
3. Commutation of Defective Charitable Remainder Trust
Fails to Save Estate Tax Deduction.
Estate of Burdick v. Comm'r, 1992-2 U.S.T.C. 60,122
(9th Cir. 11/1992), aff'g 96 T.C. 168 (1991). Decedent's
holographic will left his estate in trust, with income to be paid
to his brother, for his life, and the remainder then split between
his brother's children and certain charities. The IRS disallowed
the deduction for the charitable interest, when the executor
obtained the consent of all of the parties to a commutation of the
trust, giving the charity immediately the value of its remainder
interest. The executor then reasserted the deduction, but the IRS
reasserted its disallowance of the deduction. The Ninth Circuit
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held for the IRS, and said that the only way in which a
nonqualified charitable remainder trust can be made qualified is
through a reformation pursuant to Code § 2055 (e) (3), and that a
commutation occurring after the estate tax return was filed could
not save the charitable deduction.
H. Code § 2056. Marital Deduction.
1. Federal Circuit Agrees That Marital Deduction is
Reduced by Administrative Expenses Paid From Income.
Fisher v. U.S., 93-1 U.S.T.C. 60,132 (Fed. Cir.
4/1993). Decedent's personal representative paid $38,694 of
administration expenses from estate income. The estate deducted
these expenses on the fiduciary income tax return. The IRS reduced
the amount of the marital deduction by this amount. The estate
relied on Estate of Richardson v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 1193, 1201
(1987), and the IRS relied on Estate of Street v. Comm'r, 974 F.2d
723 (6th Cir. 1992). The Federal Circuit agreed with the Sixth
Circuit, and held that Regs. § 20.2056(b)-4(a) applied directly and
required that administration expenses be reflected in the marital
deduction. The Federal Circuit agreed that administrative expenses
accrue at death even though they may actually be paid later.
Therefore, the administrative expenses must be reflected in the
gross estate that exists at death. If administrative expenses are
paid from the income of the estate that is earned after death, then
the gross estate is larger than it would have been had the
administrative expenses been paid from the principal of the gross
estate.
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2. Fifth Circuit Permits Ezecutor's Option On Whether
to Create QTIP.
Estate of Clayton, Jr. v. Comm'r, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir.
11/1992), revsg 97 T.C. 327 (1991). Husband's Will created a
marital trust for the wife (in which she had. an absolute income
interest), and a nonmarital trust for the benefit of the wife and
their children. Husband's Will said that the executors (including
the wife, who was a co-executor), could by timely election, treat
any portion of the residue as qualifying for the estate tax marital
deduction under the QTIP rules, and that the portion not thus
deducted would be added to the nonmarital trust. The IRS said that
none of the marital trust was deductible because of the executor's
power to deny the widow her income interest through an election.
The Tax Court agreed with the IRS, but the Fifth Circuit disagreed
and held for the taxpayer. The Court reviewed the history of the
marital deduction and examined the wording of Code § 2056(b) (7).
The Court disagreed with the Tax Court over the "property" to which
the election applied. The Tax Court had viewed the executor as
making a partial election with respect to the entire residuary
estate, and disallowed the marital deduction because part of the
property over which the election was made would pass to someone
other than the surviving spouse. The Fifth Circuit said that the
executor's election only related to choosing a fractional share of
the residue. The Court said that the law refers to the terms of
the property that "the executor elected to treat as Qualifying
Terminable Interest Property." § 2056(b)(7) (B)(i)(II). (The same
language is contained in Prop. Regs. § 20.2056(b) -7(b)(3)). Thus,
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the focus is on the terms of the QTIP after the election, not
before.
3. Interest Deducted on Estate Income Tax Return Does
Not Reduce Marital Deduction--Administration
Expenses So Deducted Do.
Estate of Street v. Comm'r, 974 F.2d 723 (6th Cir.
9/1992), aff'g in part and rev'g in part 56 T.C.M. 774 (1989). A
decedent's estate left $10,000 to his estate and the balance to a
marital deduction trust. The estate claimed interest and
administration expenses as deductions on the estate's fiduciary
income tax return, but did not use these items to reduce the estate
tax marital deduction. The estate contended that these items were
payable from estate income, rather than principal, and therefore
did not reduce the marital deduction. State law (the original
Uniform Principal and Income Act) did not state which expenses
should be paid from income and which from principal. The Sixth
Circuit held that interest paid by the estate from income did not
reduce the marital deduction, but that administration expenses so
paid did reduce the marital deduction. The Court said that the
interest payments accrued only after death, and thus could be paid
from income without reducing the marital deduction under Regs. §
20.2056 (b)-4(a). See Estate of Richardson v. Comm'r, 89 T.C. 1193
(1987). The Court said that administration expenses, however,
accrue effective to the date of death, and thus must reduce the
marital deduction whether paid from income or principal.
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I. Estate Tax Procedures.
1. Beneficiaries of Life Insurance Policies Liable for
Unpaid Estate Taxes and Interest, Even Though It
Exceeds Proceeds Received.
Baptiste, Jr. v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. No. 16 (3/1993). The
proceeds of a life insurance on decedent's life were included in
decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. The
beneficiaries were personally liable for the taxes as transferees.
The total of tax due plus interest exceeded the proceeds received.
The Tax Court agreed with the IRS that the beneficiaries were still
liable for the tax, despite Code § 6324(a)(2), which limits
transferee liability for unpaid estate tax and interest accrued
thereon that is owed by a transferor. The Court held that the
limitation does not apply to transferee liability for interest
accrued on unpaid estate tax owed by a transferee. Instead the
statute imposes a direct, personal and primary obligation on the
transferee.
2. Revenue.Procedure Permits Relief on Three Estate Tax
Elections.
Rev. Proc. 92-85, 1992-42 I.R.B., p. 32 (10/1992).
Relief is provided to taxpayers who reasonably and in good faith
fail to make certain timely elections, if relief does not put the
taxpayers in a better position than they would have been in had
they made a timely election. The procedure provides for an
automatic 12-month extension for the election to value qualified
real estate under Code § 2032A(d) (1), the election to treat a
qualified payment right as not being qualified under §
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2701(c)(3)(c), and the election to treat any distribution as a
qualified payment.
III. GIFT TAXES.
A. Code § 2503. Annual Exclusion.
Noncharitable Gifts by Check Can Be Completed Transfers
in Year That Check is Given to Donee, Even-Though Check
Not Cashed Until Following Year.
Estate of Metzger v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. No. 14 (3/1993).
Decedent's power of attorney authorized his son to make gifts from
decedent's assets to decedent's heirs and their spouses.
Decedent's son wrote annual exclusion checks to*himself and his
wife on decedent's checking account. The checks were written on
December 14 and deposited on December 31, but they were not
presented and accepted by the drawee bank until the following year.
The IRS contended that the gifts were completed only in the year
in which they were honored by the drawee bank, but the Tax Court
disagreed. The Tax Court agreed that Maryland law treated a check
as a completed transfer only when the drawee bank accepted it, but
also held that the relation-back doctrine treats a gift by check
as a completed gift in the year in which the check is drawn, if (a)
the donor's intent can be clearly established, (b) delivery is
completed unconditionally, and (c) the check is presented in the
same year in which it is written.
Note. This should also apply in the estate tax context,
and should be distinguished from situations in which the checks are
not deposited or cashed until after death, or in - which
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circumstances suggest an understanding or arrangement to withhold
cashing the checks until after death.
B. Code § 2511. Taxable Gifts.
IRS Continues to Equate Lack of Assertiveness with
Gift-Giving.
Ltr. Rul. 9301001. An individual created a corporation
with both voting common and voting preferred stock. He gave his
children the common stock and retained the preferred stock that was
to pay a $3 noncumulative dividend on each share. The market
return on preferred stock of new publicly-held corporations when
he created the corporation was 11.55%, but the yield on taxpayer's
shares was set at .0038%. His voting control permitted him to
compel liquidation and receive $2,500,000, increase the dividend
rate on the preferred shares, or convert the preferred shares into
common stock. The IRS ruled that he was making continuing gifts
to his children (the holders of common stock) when he acquiesced
to the corporation's not paying higher dividends.
C. Code § 2512. Valuation of Gifts.
1. Eighth Circuit Rejects Use of Actuarial Tables for
Income Interest in Stock With Minimal Dividend
History, But Rejects Zero Value Rule, Too.
O'Reilly v. Comm'r, 973 F.2d 1403 (8th Cir. 9/1992),
rev'g and rem'g 95 T.C. 646 (1990). In 1985, an individual created
a grantor retained income trust (GRIT), and assigned to it stock
of several closely-held corporations. The trustee was given the
power to invest and reinvest the trust assets. Historically, the
-34-
corporations had paid a dividend of under 1%, but the taxpayer
valued the income interest in the GRIT according to the actuarial
tables in the regulations, which, at that time, assumed a 10% rate
of return. The IRS contended that the retained income interest had
no ascertainable value and, therefore, under Regs. § 25.2512-1,
said that the gift was 100% of the stock's fair market value. The
Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held that the 10% tables
could not be used when the real return on the investment was
clearly far less than 10%. The Court also rejected the IRS
zero-value analysis, saying that there was a dividend history and
that the stock must be valued according to the actual dividend
history.
2. Actuarial Tables Inapplicable When Wasting Asset
Will Expire Before Trust's Income Interest.
Froh v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. No. 1 (1/1993). An individual
assigned $1,500,000 worth of gas leases to three "Clifford" trusts,
requiring that the net income be paid to his children for ten years
and one month, with a reversion in him or his estate. The trustee
was directed to create a depletion reserve to which 15% of the
income would be credited. The grantor valued the income interests
by allocating 85% of the $1,500,000 to the income interests and
then applying the discounts for a ten-year trust under
then-applicable Regs. § 25.2512-5(f). The Tax Court agreed with the
IRS that the tables could not be applied to the trust income
interest when the asset would expire before the ten-year term of
the-trust. The Court said that while the use of actuarial tables
is presumptively correct, it is a rebuttable presumption and the
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facts of this case showed that the tables should not apply.
Therefore, the value of the gift was 85% of the $1,500,000.
3. IRS Concedes Minority Discount Despite Family
Control.
Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-7 I.R.B., p. 13 (1/1993). The IRS
has finally bowed to the weight of judicial authority and has ruled
that, where a donor gives 20% of the stock of a closely-held
corporation to each of the donor's five children, the factor of
corporate control in the family should not be considered in valuing
the stock for gift tax purposes. Thus, a minority discount is
allowed despite the fact that the transferred interest, when
aggregated with interests held by family members, is part of a
controlling interest.
IV. SPECIAL VALUATION RULES
A. Use of Adjacent Guest House Does Not Prejudice QPRT.
Ltr. Rul. 9328040. An individual proposed to create a
QPRT to hold a 1.65 acre parcel of land that includes a large main
house and a small adjacent ranch house. The primary property is
used as a vacation house for himself. The ranch house has a value
of less than 4% of the total value of the property. He
occasionally permits family members to use the guest house with-
out rent. The IRS ruled that the trust remained a QPRT, and that
the incidental rent-free use of the guest house by family members
did not mean that the property was used as a residence under Regs.
§ 25.2702-5(c) (2) (iii).
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B. Favorably Reviewed QPRT Also Taxed as Grantor Trust.
Ltr. Rul. 9315010. An individual transferred her
community property interest in a residence to a 20-year QPRT that
required payment of all income to her during the trust's term. The
trust provided that she had to agree to pay all expenses relating
to the maintenance of the residence. The IRS ruled that the trust
was a wholly-owned grantor trust because of the right to receive
income and a power of appointment held by a special trustee who was
a subservient, related or subordinate party. Neither the trust
provisions requiring her to pay maintenance costs nor the proposed
sale of a 1/5 remainder interest in the residence trust adversely
affected the trust's status as a QPRT. Because the grantor
retained no powers over the disposition of the income or princi-
pal of the residence trust, upon execution of the trust, the
grantor made a completed gift of 4/5 of the remainder interest to
four trusts established for the benefit of her children.
C. Private Annuity Bought From Trust is a Qualified Interest
Under Code § 2702.
Ltr. Rul. 9253031. An individual transferred $5,000,000
in marketable securities to a $19,000,000 trust created in 1933 by
his father. The trust will pay him an unsecured annuity valued in
accordance with the tables under Code § 7520. The agreement will
require that he make no other contributions to the trust during his
lifetime and will preclude prepayment of the annuity. The IRS
ruled that the private annuity arrangement is a qualified interest
under Regs. § 25.2702-3(b) and 25.2702-3(d).
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D. GRAT Qualified Under Code § 2702; As Grantor Trust It May
Hold S Corporation Stock; IRB Declines to Value Annuity.
Ltr. Rul. 9248016. An individual created a trust to pay
a fixed' quarterly annuity (or, if greater, all of the trust
incme), for 15 years or until his death, whichever first occurs.
Neither he nor his spouse may serve as trustee, and the remainder
beneficiaries are his children and their descendants. He retained
the nonfiduciary power to reacquire the trust assets by
substituting assets of equivalent value. The IRS ruled that this
was a qualified GRAT, and that the nonfiduciary power to reacquire
assets made the trust an eligible S corporation stockholder. Code
§ 6 7 5 -(4 *).* The IRS valued the right to the annuity ignoring the
right to excess income. It also noted that, because of the size
of the annuity and the trustee's power to invest in speculative
assets (such as the S corporation stock), the entire trust fund
might be exhausted before the expiration of the 15-year term.
Therefore, the IRS refused to express an opinion regarding the use
of the entire 15-year term in valuing the annuity interest. Citing
Rev. Rul. 77-454, 1977-2 C.B. 351.
V. A CRYSTAL BALL
The following items may be considered in future tax
legislation during this Congress.
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A. A change in § 2035(d) to clarify when gifts made within
three years of death from a revocable trust are ihcluded in the
donor's gross estate.
B. A clarification to § 2207A regarding inadvertent waivers
of the right to recovery for estate taxes attributable to qual'fied
interest property.
C. A repeal of the "throwback rule" under §§ 665 and 666.
D. Provisions to conform the income tax treatment of
revocable trusts (after the death of the grantor) to the manner
estates are treated for income tax purposes.
&0 1.m~k~ U
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